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EABLIER chapters have considered the universe of straight cor-
porate bonds as a more or less homogeneous aggregate; in this
chapter we consider the morbidity of that aggregate. The basic
annual statistics relating to the volume of defaults on straight
corporate bonds are presented in Tables A-17 and A-18, which
cover outstandings in default, new defaults, defaulted bonds
restored to good standing or extinguished (i.e. "default settle-
ments"), and net changes in outstandings in default.' Like the
statistics for total funded debt (which include defaulted bonds
as well as those in good standing), the several series on defaults
form an interrelated set. The difference between new defaults
and default settlements is the net change in outstandings in de-
fault. The latter series when cumulated generates the amount
outstanding in default at the beginning of each calendar year.
In keeping with our general plan of examining only the salient
features of corporate funded debt, we consider in the present
volume only the broad aggregates relating to corporate bond
defaults and their major industry and size breakdowns. Our
definitions of the terms
CC default"and "default settlement"
'will indicate the types of situations to be analyzed and their rela-
live importance. After describing the procedures used in con-
structing the default estimates, we then investigate the secular
and cyclical behavior of the various series, the relative importance
of new defaults and of default settlements as joint determinants
of the net change in outstandings in default, and the rates at
which bonds have moved into and out of a state of default. The
chapter concludes with a discussion of the period of time required
to settle default situations.
1Defaultestimates have not been developed for minor types of issues.
To extend our straight bond estimates to cover the minor types, it would
suffice for most purposes to add information on serial bond defaults. Equip-
ment obligations have an excellent default record; and income bonds, be-
cause of their contingent interest provisions, are not liable to default of
interest. Moreover, the majority of the income bonds offered during the
period under study had not matured by 1944 and thus were not subject to
default of principal.DEFAULTS 181
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
Our data indicate that the aggregate volume of outstanding
defaults was relatively unimportant during the first three decades
of the century, amounting on the average to less than one-half
billion dollars, or 2.75 percent of average outstandings. After 1931
there was an abrupt increase to a peak of slightly over $8.9 billion
(14.9 percent of total outstandings)in 1936, followed by a
gradual decline to $3.0 billion (18.0 percent) by the close of 1943.
This bulge in defaulted bond outstandings during the Great
Depression, attributable in the first instance to the increase of
new defaults, was accentuated by a lengthening of the period
from default to settlement. The latter cause applied especially to
rail bonds: although default rates were actually lower on rail
bonds than on industrials during 1930-43, industrial defaults were
quickly settled whereas rail defaults were not. In consequence
the major part of the defaulted outstandings that overhung and
depressed the corporate bond market in the late thirties and early
forties consisted of rail issues. Although in the thirties defaults
on small issues were settled somewhat more rapidly than on large
issues, the small issues had otherwise an inferior record.
New defaults and the net changes in outstanding defaults
typically decline in periods of generally expanding business
activity and rise during business contractions; default settlements,
although considerably less sensitive to general business condi-
tions, exhibit rough positive conformity with business cycles.
Default situations tend to be settled somewhat faster during
expansion than during contraction phases of the cycle, as, of
course, would be expected, since settlements are more easily ar-
ranged in times of rising than of declining income. Defaulted
issues have generally been adjusted more rapidly in the non-
regulated industries than in the publicly regulated group; and
adjustments have been more rapid for industries having a rela-
tively simple capital structure than for others.
COVERAGE AND DERIVATION OF DEFAULT SERIES
Distress situations on corporate bonds range from minor delays
in payment of interest or failure to make payment into a sinking
fund to the extreme case in which an entire issue may be adjudged
worthless. Therefore it has been necessary to distinguish arbi-
trarily between default and nondefault situations; and in so doing182 DEFAULTS
we have been neither so liberal nor so narrowly technical as we
might have been. A default is defined as (1) a failure to pay
interest or principal in the full contractual amount when due, or
(2)anexchange or contract modification (of an issue otherwise
in good standing) in which the new security received or the
modified issue is worth less than par. Sinking fund omissions,
which are usually not matters of public record and in most cases
are not acted on by the corporate trustee, are not treated here as
defaults. On the other hand, any delay in the payment of interest
is considered a default even though the duration of the delay
may have been within a grace period allowed under the bond in-
denture. A "default settlement" occurs when a defaulted issue
is either restored to good standing or extinguished. When the act
of default consists in a "noncontractual" exchange or contract
modification, the date of settlement is coincident with the date
of default. Exchanges and contract modifications have been de-
fined in Chapter 8; the noncontractual cases are those where the
new security or modified issue is worth less than par.
Distribution of Defaults by Nature
of Default and Settlement
The relative importance of the various types of defaults and
settlements covered by the above definitions may be determined
from the distributions of total defaults and settlements of straight
bonds presented in Table 19. This table, summarizing default
experience for the years 1900-1943 inclusive, is based on Tables
A-19 and A-20, which present similar information annually by
major industry and size groups. Defaults are here classified by
the proximate nature of default. Thus, failure to pay interest,
even though followed later by a default of principal, is classified
as an interest default. A principal default can occur only at
maturity. Simultaneous interest and principal defaults at maturity
occur rarely in the case of corporate bonds; when they do, they
are grouped with defaults of principal, along with the more usual
cases in which interest continues to be paid through maturity.
The breakdowns in Table 19 are useful in adjusting the estimates
of total defaults and settlements for special types of analyses and
in appraising the seriousness of the various types of default situa-
tions that have occurred in the past.































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































bonds outstanding at any time in the period January 1, 1900 to
January 1, 1944, $14.5 billion or 18.7 percent represented issues
that had gone to default by January 1, 1944.2Inaddition, bonds
totaling $0.4 billion had defaulted a second time—that is, after
settlement of an original default of interest—making a total par
amount of straight corporate bond defaults of $14.9 billion. Of
that total, $6.7 billion (45 percent) represents rail bonds, $4.8
billion (32 percent) utilities, and $3.4 billion (23 percent) in-
dustrials. Large issues (issues whose offerings summed to $5
millionor more) that defaulted amounted to $10.5 billion (71
percent of total defaults); small issues, $4.4 billion (29 percent).
The table shows that for the combined industries 65 percent
of total defaults, by the par amount of the issues involved,
initially took the form of interest defaults, while only 8 percent
represented defaults of principal and 24 percent noncontractual
exchanges and contract modifications. The 24 percent breaks
down into 8 percent for bonds exchanged or modified at maturity
(analogous to principal defaults) and 16 percent for bonds ex-
changed or modified before maturity (analogous to interest de-
faults).
The distributions for the various industry and size groups are
surprisingly similar. In relation to the total volume of defaults
within the industry group, the public utilities had the lowest
proportion of bonds defaulting before maturity (interest defaults
plus noncontractual exchanges before maturity) while industrials
had the highest proportion. This finding, when coupled with
the fact that a smaller proportion of utility bonds went to de-
fault than of bonds of other industry groups (see Table 22),
indicates that the utilities had less difficulty than did industrial
obligors in meeting interest payments on their obligations, a con-
clusion that is consistent with the observed stability of utility
as compared with industrial earnings.
The question naturally arises whether interest defaults are of
a less serious nature than principal defaults. Some light is thrown
on the matter by the classification of interest defaults accord-
2Analogousfigures for number of issues are approximately 5,000 going
to default out of 21,000 outstanding at the beginning of the period or of-
fered subsequently (24 percent). The higher default percentage for number
of issues than for par amount is attributable largely to the heavier incidence
of default on small issues (see page 208).DEFAULTS 185
ing to nature of settlement in Table For all straight bonds
considered, only 9 percent of the par amount of interest defaults
(6 percent of total defaults) represented bonds later restored
to good standing by payment of back interest, the remaining
91 percent representing situations serious enough that settlement
either had not occurred by 1944 or had involved the retirement
of the entire issue.4 Moreover, not all interest-defaulted issues
restored to good standing continued in good standing: those that
defaulted a second time (totaling $0.4 billion in par amount)
made up 44 percent of the 9 percent of interest-defaulted issues
whose back interest was repaid. The remaining 56 percent does
not necessarily, of course, represent prompt and full settlements.
While certain of the interest defaults resulted in only slight loss
to investors when the issues were restored to good standing, in
other cases back interest was only partially repaid after a long delay
and there was no provision for the payment of interest on interest.
Yet even if the whole 56 percent—that is, the par amount of all
interest-defaulted issues restored to good standing and not again
going into default—is eliminated from total defaults, the ratio
of defaults to total offerings (including bonds outstanding on
January 1, 1900) is reduced only from 18.7 to 18.1 percent. We
conclude that interest delays are usually precursors of more
serious difficulties, and that to classify even slight delays in the
payment of interest as defaults is not unduly stringent.
Exchanges and contract modifications were the most important
form of default settlement, 66 percent of total defaults (by par
amount of the issues involved) being settled thereby. Interest-
defaulted bonds restored to good standing and interest or princi..
pal defaults settled by cash payment together account for only
11 percent of the par amount of settlements. The remainder
(aside from bonds for which information on nature of default
or settlement was lacking, whose total amount was small) repre-
sents defaults still not settled by the end of the period studied.
8Inthe classification of defaulted issues by nature of settlement, minority
interests were disregarded and all bondholders were assumed to have fol-
lowed the plan accepted by the majority.
A later volume will analyze bond experience by means of realized yields,
which take account of all payments (whether of interest or of principal) on
defaulted issues.DEFAULTS
Large rail issues accounted for the major part of the amount
defaulted and not yet settled by 1944.
Derivation of Estimates
Like the other detailed estimates developed in our study, the
default estimates are based on all straight issues of $5 million
and over and a 10 percent sample of the smaller issues. It was
necessary first to effect a reconciliation of the information avail-
able on the default status of the issues included and then to ad-
just the small sample totals to obtain universe estimates for small
bonds.
The Corporate Bond Project data sheets contain, for each de-
faulted issue included in the samples, information on the dates
and amounts outstanding at default and at settlement, and on
the amounts outstanding at the beginning of the quadrennial
years 1900, 1904, etc.5 The first step was to check the individual
issues to make certain that the recorded amounts were in agree-
ment. In the few cases in which the amounts failed to agree, or
where incomplete information was provided, a search of other
sources (principally the Commercial and Financial Chronicle)
was undertaken. Information was obtained, also, on a small
number of defaulted issues partially extinguished before the
settlement date and on a still smaller number of "offerings" of
defaulted issues (usually the release to the public of defaulted
bonds previously held under pledge). In a few cases where it
was known that an issue was outstanding in default in certain
years, but the year of default or of settlement was unknown, it
was necessary to infer the dates. Since the manuals generally
provide information as of the beginning of the calendar year
of publication, we used for the year of default the year just prior
to the first published reference stating that the issue was in de-
fault, and for the year of settlement the year of the last published
reference to the defaulted issue.
The data sheets are described fully in the memoranda mentioned in
Appendix B, page 889f. Readers already familiar with them may be interested
in the particular records used. Information on dates and amounts of defaults
and settlements was taken from the Record of Corporate Bond Defaults,
and information on quadrennial outstandings from the Periodic Record of
Corporate Bond Experience.DEFAULTS 187
After all materials had been reconciled, the issues were clas-
sified annually into six industry-size groups (large rails, small
rails,etc.). Within each group the annual estimates of new
defaults and of default settlements were then used to generate
outstandings in default, by procedures used elsewhere in the
study (cf. page 27).
No further adjustment was required for the large issues, but
it was necessary to raise the sample figures for small issues to
obtain estimates of the total volume of bond defaults. The sample
estimates for outstandings in default were adjusted by means
of annual raising factors obtained by dividing the par amount
of all small bonds outstanding (defaults plus nondefaults) in each
industry group by the corresponding par amount in the small
bond sample. The adjusted amounts provided the final estimates
of outstandings in default, and their first differences gave the
final estimates of net changes in defaulted outstandings (for small
issues).
It 4s required that the difference between the final estimates for
new defaults and for default settlements equal the estimated
net change in outstandings in default. On the assumption that
the sample proportions of small-bond outstandings that go to de-
fault or are settled within a year hold for the universe of small
bonds, we would apply the same raising factors used to obtain
outstandings in default against the sample values of new defaults
and default settlements. The estimates thus obtained, however,
would not be consistent with the estimated net change in out-
standings in default unless the raising factors remained constant
from one year to the next. Although the annual factors are quite
stable, they are not constant, so that a minor adjustment was
required to obtain the final estimates for new defaults and settle-
ments.6 The final estimates for large and small issues are corn-
6Inthe following, upper case letters represent our universe estimates for
small issues, lower case letters, the sample values, and subscripts, the year.





Final estimates for outstandings in default at the beginning of the ith188 DEFAULTS
bined for the industry breakdown in Table A-17 and are pre-
sented separately in Table A-18.
Because the raising factors for outstandings were stable, they
were used also for obtaining initial estimates for Tables A-19
and A-20 on nature of default and settlement. The annual dis-
crepancies between the estimates of total new defaults obtained
in that way and those presented in Tables A-17 and A-iS were
then prorated on the basis of the sample classification by nature
of default and settlement to make Tables A-19 and A-20 con-
sistent with the basic series.
DEFAULTED AND NONDEFAULTED BONDS OUTSTANDING
The principal movements of outstanding straight bonds in default
will be examined in the subsection below and related to total
year and for new defaults and default settlements during theithyear were






(3) S4 = — —
R4=04/o1isthe raising factor appropriate to the beginning of
the ith year and Rj+l = thefactor appropriate to the end
of the ith year.
While it is not known that these formulas possess optimal properties in
the probability sense, they yield reasonable estimates and consistent ones in
the sense that N4 —S4=Di+1—Subtracting (3) from (2), we obtain
N4 —S4=R1+1(—+ (R4+1 —
=R4+1(d4+n4_84)—R1d4
which demonstrates that the requirement for consistent estimates is met.
It will be noted that formulas (2) and (3) reduce to the particularly
simple forms
N4 =R4n4and=R1s4
when the raising factors are invariant with respect to time. Since the actual
raising factors used were quite stable, the adjustment factors inserted in (2)
and (3) (the terms involving R4+1 —R4)were quite small. The expression
n4/(n4 + s1)anditscomplement s4/(n4 +were introduced intothe
formulas for pragmatic reasons, to reduce the probability of occurrence of
negative estimates for N4 and S4.DEFAULTS 189
outstandings. Another subsection will deal with estimates for
bonds in good standing.
in Default
As Charts 22 and 23 make plain, the volume of defaulted bonds
of the combined industries, both in absolute and in relative
terms, was quite unimportant until 1908 (being under $0.1 billion,
or less than 1 percent of total funded debt). From then until
1916, outstandings in default moved upward, with a particularly
sharp increase occurring in the contraction year 1914. By 1916
the aggregate volume of defaulted bonds stood just above $1.0
billion, or at 6 percent of total funded debt. Thereafter until
the beginning of 1931 the absolute volume fluctuated rather in-
decisively around an average level of $0.7 billion; but since out-
standings were increasing over that period (Chart 2, page 44),
the proportion in default fell below 2 percent. The abnormally
heavy defaults that followed carried the total par amount of
outstandings in default to its absolute maximum of $3.9 billion
at the beginning of 1936 (14.9 percent of total funded debt).
Small declines in 1936 and 1937 were almost exactly offset by
a new wave of defaults in 1938 and 1939; but the total volume
of outstandings declined over 1936-39, and the proportion of
debt in default continued to rise, reaching a peak of 15.3 per-
cent at the beginning of 1940. Thereafter, default settlements
exceeded new defaults, and outstandings in default declined both
absolutely and in relation to total funded debt.
As Chart 24 indicates, railroad defaults were mainly responsible
for the dramatic increase in outstandings in default during the
Great Depression. In many of the earlier years, too, the railroads
were responsible for a large part of the amount outstanding in
default; in fact, rail defaults accounted for more than 50 percent
of total defaults in 14 of the first 34 years covered by the study
and for more than 75 percent in the years 1900, 1907, and 1917.
But the comparatively large volume of rail bonds outstanding
in default up to 1933 was not excessive considering the total of
rail-bond outstandings (Chart 23). Despite a rather poor show-
ing in 1915-17, the average percentage in default calculated
through the beginning of 1933 was lower for rails than for either
of the other two industry groups. After that, however, the posi-
tion of the railroads deteriorated rapidly, the proportion of rail190 DEFAULTS








































































the financial collapse of the thirties, utility defaults did not rise
above 7.1 percent of outstandings (1934) and by 1944 had de-
clined to 8.5 percent. In the period of heavy utility defaults after
World War I approximately eight-tenths of the total amount
represented bonds of street railways, and in the thirties from a
half to two-thirds.7 Thus it appears that utilities other than street
railways had an excellent record.
The record of industrial defaults is somewhat more checkered
than that of the utilities but is better in most respects than that
of the rails. Industrial outstandings in default rose sharply from
$0.1 billion in 1931 to $1.1 bfflion in 1934 (or from 2.0 to 23.8
percent of industrial outstandings). The subsequent fall, how-
ever, was equally abrupt, so that by 1944, as in 1931, only $0.1
billion (this time 4.8 percent of outstandings) was in default.
The data show that, over and above the obvious effects of the
business cycle, secular trends in industry have a direct influence
on corporate bond defaults. Because of truck and bus competi-
tion the rails have been in a poor position trafficwise since the
twenties, and street railways have been a declining industry
since World War I. Therefore it is not surprising that defaults
were particularly heavy in those fields. On the other hand, de-
faults were lightest among bonds of the electric utilities, largely
because such companies have enjoyed a very rapid rate of secular
growth since 1900, even more rapid than that of the manufac-
turing industries.
One of the most persistent relationships observed in the data
is the relatively high ratio of defaults to outstandings for small
as compared with large issues. To be sure, small issues are of-
fered in many cases by large concerns; nevertheless a question
is posed as to whether small business units have a poorer record
than large ones. Although the question cannot be examined fully
within the scope of this report, it will be dealt with in later mono-
graphs.8
Separate statistics on street railway defaults and on defaults in other
minor industry groups will be presented in a later monograph.
8Somematerial bearing on the question of size and risk (default and loss
rates on bonds in different asset size classffications) will be presented in a
later volume. A more detailed investigation of the funded debt experience
of small- and medium-sized industrial obligorsisbeing undertaken by
Elizabeth T. Simpson.194 DEFAULTS
Outstandings in Good Standing
The material developed on outstandings of defaulted bonds has
been used in conjunction with the data on total outstandings in
Tables A-2 and A-6 to obtain estimates for nondefaulted bonds.
The resulting estimates, covering straight bonds, are presented in
Table A-21. Since virtually all institutional investors and personal
trust accounts are prohibited either by statute, by regulatory
authority, or by custom from purchasing bonds in default, the
estimates for nondefaulted bonds approximate closely the upper
limit of investment outlets available to those groups.
Until 1914 practically all bonds were in good standing: 98 per-
cent of total outstandings or better. The proportion fell rapidly
in the following two years to a iow of 94 percent, and then rose
gradually until it again stood at 98 percent during the period
1927-81. The peak amount for absolute volume of straight bonds
in good standing ($28.1 billion)is recorded at the beginning
of 1931, although total outstandings did not reach their peak until
one year later ($29.0 billion). Both total outstandings and the
volume in good standing fell in the late thirties and early forties;
by January 1, 1944 nondefaulted bonds amounted to only $19.8
billion, or 87 percent of the total.
The pronounced shrinkage in the volume of investment outlets
available to the investment intermediaries after 1931 is indicated
by the fact that by 1944 the total volume of straight bonds in
good standing was no larger than it had been two decades earlier
(1923). Owing partly to the heavy volume of rail defaults and
partly to the contraction in rail debt, the shrinkage in the volume
of rail bonds in good standing was especially pronounced, the
par amount outstanding at the beginning of 1944 being just above
the amount outstanding on January 1, 1906. The shrinkages in the
utility and industrial fields were somewhat less marked, the
volume of bonds in the former group standing in 1944 at about its
1928 level and in the latter group at its 1921 level. For these two
industry groups the decline in the total volume of funded debt
outstanding largely explains the shrinkage.
NEW DEFAULTS, DEFAULT SETTLEMENTS, AND
NET CHANGES IN OUTSTANDINCS IN DEFAULT
The annual estimates of the volume of new defaults and of default
settlements from Tables A-17 and A-18 are presented in Chart 25.DEFAULTS 195
The difference between these estimates is the net change in out-
standings in default, indicated in the chart as a white area if
positive and as a shaded area if negative.
An analogy may be drawn between total offerings and new
defaults and also between total extinguishments and default set-
tlements, the former pair of series measuring gross inflows into
their respective stocks of outstandings, and the latter, gross out-
flows from their stocks. Like the estimates for total offerings and
extinguishments, the default series are of the gross type (cf. page
65). As has been mentioned, new defaults and default settle-
ments cover (1) certain exchanges and contract modifications for
which the dates of default and settlement coincide, and (2) in-
terest and principal defaults for which the dates of settlement lag
behind the dates of default. The overlapping exchanges and con-
tract modifications can be eliminated from both series without
affecting the estimates of the net change in outstandings in de-
fault, but since their amounts are relatively small, they are in-
cluded in most of the analysis that follows.
Secular and Cyclical Behavior
of the Series
The general impression obtained from Chart 25 is one of pro-
nounced cyclical variation in new defaults, with the series reach-
ing peaks at or near trough years in general business activity
and troughs at or near peak years. Default settlements, on the
other hand, show less sensitivity to the changing pace of business
activity and a lower amplitude of variation.
For the combined industries, successive waves of new defaults
reached crests in 1904, 1908, 1914, 1919, 1924, 1927, 1933, and
1939, the first six coinciding with trough years in general business
activity and the last two lagging by one year. The fact that 1921
does not turn up in this list is quite striking; a possible explana-
tion is that the railroads, which were in difficulty at that time,
were supplied funds by the federal government. The years 1914-
15, 1919, 1931-35, and 1938-39 stand out as periods of unusually
heavy defaults. The railroads accounted for a major share of new
defaults in most of these periods, namely in 1914-15, 1933, 1935,
and 1938-39. The utilities were the worst offenders in 1919, 1932,
and 1934. Industrial defaults were unusually heavy in 1931-33.
While rail bonds accounted for a substantial portion of the par196 DEFAULTS
CHART25—New Defaults, Default Settlements, and Net
Changes in Corporate Bond Outstandings in Default,
1900-1943
16 '20 24 '28 32 36DEFAULTS 197
From Tables A-17 and A-18; straight bonds, yearly totals, par amount.
Shaded areas, representing contractions in general business activity, and
white areas, representing expansions, ore from Arthur F. Burns and Wesley
C. Mitchell's Measuring Business Cycles (Notional Bureau of Economic Re-
search,1 946), p. 78.
amountof new defaults in the thirties, they were the slowest togo
to default, the period of heaviest defaults beginning in 1931 for
industrials, in 1982 for utilities, and in 1983 for rails. And while
the records of the other two industry groups were quite good
after 1934, substantial volumes of rail bonds went to default in
1935 and again in 1938-39. In general the default experience of
large issues paralleled that of the rails, since many of the large
issues were rail issues. The heaviest defaults on small issues oc-
curred in 1931-82 and were almost entirely in the nonrail groups.9






— New defaults net change
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Whereas new defaults are dominated by general business con-
ditions and exhibit marked contracyclical swings, default settle-
ments are influenced by a greater variety of factors and show less
pronounced cyclical variation. The relative insensitivity of default
settlements to business cycles is the outcome of an averaging
process brought about by variations in the length of time required
to adjust distress situations. If this time interval were identical
for each of the issues going to default, the series for default set-
tlements would simpiy be a replica of the series for new defaults,
lagged a given number of years. On the other hand, if the new
defaults of each year were always settled uniformly over a given
number of years, the annual series for settlements would be a
simple moving average of new defaults. For example, if bonds
totaling one-tenth of the par amount of new defaults in each
year were always settled in the first year following default, one-
tenth in the second, and so on up to the tenth year, the settle-
ment series would be a moving average of new defaults with an
average lag of five years (one-half the reciprocal of the propor-
tion settled within each year).
The actual behavior of default settlements is intermediate
between the two extremes; the settlements series is neither an
exact replica nor a simple moving average of new defaults. Rather
it is a complex average within which there is considerable shifting
of the weights from one year to the next. In some years new
defaults are quickly settled, particularly when a large proportion
of the par amount of bonds going to default represents cases in
which the act of default is a noncontractual exchange or contract
modification (that is, when the settlement is coincident with the
default). But when defaults are mainly on interest or principal,
defaults on large issues 5 times and coincided 4 times out of 9 comparisons.
This finding is particularly interesting since other National Bureau studies
show that failures of small firms tend to lag behind those of large firms. In
the case of corporate bonds, part of the timing difference is caused by the
fact that nonrail defaults typically lead rail defaults and that the proportion
of rail issues in large issues is greater than in small issues (in 9 comparisons,
industrial defaults led rail defaults at 5 specific peaks, coincided 3 times, and
lagged once). A size breakdown of defaults by industry group gives further
evidence of the tendency for defaults on small issues to lead those on large
issues. Out of a total of 22 possible comparisons within the three industry
subgroups, small issues led the large at peaks 9 times, coincided 11 times,
and lagged twice.DEFAULTS 199
the periods of settlement may range from a few days to many
years.
If all defaults were settled by noncontractual exchange or
contract modification, the correlation coefficient between cur-
rent new defaults and settlements would be +1.00, since de-
faults and settlements would coincide. Because some part of the
amount of new defaults is usually made up of such exchanges
and modifications, we must expect a positive correlation between
the two series. Thus 24 percent of the par amount of total new
defaults for the period 1900-1943 consisted of defaults immedi-
ately settled by noncontractual exchange or contract modifica-
tion (Table 19), and some other defaults were settled after a
very brief delay. As expected, the correlation coefficients for
concurrent new defaults and settlements are positive but low
(+0.55 for the combined industries, +0.25 for rails, +0.61 for
utilities, and +0.39 for industrials; see Table 21). It is noteworthy
that the coefficient is lowest for the railroad group, where non-
contractual exchanges constituted the smallest proportion of the
total par amount of defaults, and is higher for the public utilities
and industrials, where such exchanges represented a larger part
of defaults. Since settlements do not systematically lag behind
defaults of interest and principal, the correlation does not im-
prove uniformly for the various industry groups when default
settlements are predated to allow for a hypothetical one-year
lag. In that case the coefficients rise to +0.74 for the combined
industries and to +0.40 for rails but fall to +0.56 for utilities
and to +0.29 for industrials. The difference in industry behavior
is largely explained by the fact that for the utility and industrial
groups, settlements on date of default were larger in comparison
with the total amount of their defaults, and settlements of interest
and principal defaults were more rapid, than for rails. In general
the results are not significantly improved by allowing for longer
lags.
There appears to have been a pronounced tendency, before
the Great Depression, for default settlements to lag new defaults
by fairly short intervals. That tendency continued in the in-
dustrial field, where heavy settlements in 1935-37 followed the
heavy defaults of 1931-33. Thus the volume of industrial out-
standings in default at the beginning of 1938 was only slightly
above the volume at the beginning of 1931 (Chart 22). Likewise200 DEFAULTS
in the public utility field settlements followed shortly after new
defaults in the thirties. Default settlements for utilities reached
peaks in 1934 and 1940 and were rather consistently above new
defaults during the middle and late thirties. The depression ex-
perience of the railroads was unique in the matter of settlements
as well as in that of defaults, for settlements showed no pro-
nounced tendency to rise until 1939.'° In fact, for the rail group
from 1931 through 1939 new defaults exceeded settlements in
every year. This explains a development already observed: that
rail outstandings in default climbed from 3.8 percent of total rail
outstandings at the beginning of 1933 to a peak of 27.9 percent
at the beginning of 1940. It was not until the period of improved
rail earnings ushered in by World War II that rail settlements
rose above new defaults and the volume of defaulted outstand-
ings began to decline.
The relationships of the various default series to the business
cycle, shown graphically in Chart 25, are expressed numerically
in the conformity indexes of Table 20. As the table indicates,
new defaults exhibit inverse conformity with business cycles.
The full-cycle indexes, except those for rail bonds and small
issues, are quite high, indicating that the volume of new de-
faults typically rises more rapidly in contraction phases (or falls
less rapidly) than in preceding and succeeding expansion phases.
The generally negative pattern of the expansion and contraction
indexes indicates, further, that new defaults tend to rise in con-
traction and to fall in expansion phases. The indexes for de-
fault settlements, on the other hand, suggest negligible cyclical
conformity, the full-cycle indexes having low negative values for
the major industry groups and low positive values for the two
size groups. Accordingly it might be expected that the net
changes in outstandings in default (that is, the differences be-
tween total new defaults and default settlements) would ex-
hibit somewhat lower negative conformity than do new de-
10Theexperience of the railroads during the Creat Depression was unique
not only as compared with that of other industry groups but also when
compared with their own experience in earlier years. As will be shown in
the discussion beginning on page 210, rail defaults were rather quickly
settled in the period 1900-1929; moreover, an examination of the twenty-five
largest railroad receiverships in the 1880's and 1890's indicates that the
period between the appointment of a receiver and the reorganization of the
road was then only about two years.DEFAULTS 201
TABLE 20—Conformity Indexes for Selected Series on Corpo-
rate Bond Defaults and Default Settlements: Ten Ref-
erence Cycles 1900-1938
Expansion Contraction Full cycle
New defaults
All industries —60 —80 —79
Railroads 0 —40 —5
Public utilities —40 —20 58
Industrials —60 —60 —79
Large issues —80 —60 —89
Small issues 0 —40 —37
Default settlements
All industries —20 —20 —5
Railroads +20 —20 —5
Public utilities —20 —20 —16
Industrials 0 —10 —15
Large issues +20 0 +5
Small issues 0 +20 +5
Net changes
Allindustries —60 —60 —89
Railroads —20 —20 —47
Public utilities —40 —40 —68
Industrials —60 —60 —58
Large issues —80 —60 —79
Small issues —40 —40 —47
Noncontractual exchanges on date of default
All industries +10 —20 37
Railroads 0 —30 0
Public utilities —30 —30 —5
Industrials +10 —30 —26
Large issues —10 —20 —16
Small issues —10 —10 —11
Defaults of interest and principal
All industries —60 —60 —79
Railroads —40 —50 —47
Public utilities —60 —40 —79
Industrials —30 —40 —58
Large issues —60 —40 —79
Small issues —40 —20 —47
Settlements of interest and principal defaults
All industries +40 0 + 16
Railroads +20 0 +16
Public utilities —40 —40 37
Industrials +40 +10 +26
Large issues +20 0 +16
Small issues 0 —20 +5
Based on annual data, Tables A-17 to A-20. These indexes do not take
account of possible leads or lags at reference-cycle turning points.202 DEFAULTS
faults. Actually, however, the net-change series often exhibit
slightly higher negative conformity than the new-defaults series.
(Note particularly the full-cycle indexes for rails and for small
issues: net-change indexes have a higher negative value than
the corresponding new-default indexes.)
A clue to an understanding of the rather anomalous _behavior
of the net-change series may be found in an examination of the
component series entering into total defaults and settlements.
It will be recalled that certain noncontractual exchanges and con-
tract modifications enter equally into both series, since they are
settled on date of default. The conformity indexes for these co-
incident defaults and settlements (referred to in the table as non-
contractual exchanges) are predominantly negative, but have
smaller negative values than do the series on total new
When the noncontractual exchanges are subtracted from the total
of new defaults, we obtain series for defaults of interest and
principal, which exhibit high negative conformity, as is usually
to be expected when a series with positive or low negative con-
formity is subtracted from one having high negative conformity.
Settlementsofinterest and principaldefaultsare obtained
analogously by subtracting noncontractual exchanges from total
default settlements. None of the full-cycle indexes for settlements
of interest and principal defaults is large, but all of them ex-
cept that for public utilities are positive. Thus the generally
positive pattern of these indexes lends limited support to the
view that it is easier to effect reorganizations and settle default
situations when earnings are expanding than when they are con-
tracting.'2
Since noncontractual exchanges and contract modifications
cancel out of both components of the net change in outstand-
ings in default, the latter series may be interpreted as the dif-
ference between interest and principal defaults and the settle-
11Thelower negative conformity of noncontractual exchanges as com-
pared with total new defaults is not surprising in view of the rather small
volume of exchanges occurring in any year and their extreme lumpiness with
respect to size. In addition, certain noncontractual exchanges and contract
modifications on issues not otherwise in default occur on date of reorganiza-
tion of the obligor, and these behave like settlements rather than new
defaults.
12"Settlementrates" on total defaults and on interest and principal defaults
also exhibit low conformity. See page 214.DEFAULTS 203
ments of such defaults. Thus interpreted, it appears as the dif-
ference between one series with high negative conformity (in-
terest and principal defaults) and another with low positive
conformity (settlements of interest and principal defaults). A
fortiori, the difference—the net change in outstanding defaults—
exhibits pronounced negative conformity with cycles in general
business activity, and in certain series the negative conformity
is even more pronounced than for total new defaults.
An insight into the timing relationships between the default
series is provided by an examination of average rank patterns
for all industries based on annual data (Chart 26; for the method
of deriving such patterns, see Chapter 4). As the chart shows,
all series except settlements of interest and principal defaults
move inversely to the business cycle. Net changes in outstand-
ings in default, new defaults, and interest and principal defaults
all exhibit clear-cut v to ix conformity; that is, they typically
expand during business contractions (cycle stages v-ix) and con-
tract during business expansions (stages i-v). Total default settle-
ments, which are a mixture of noncontractual exchanges and
settlements of interest and principal defaults, expand over stages
v-rn; and the conformity indexes, when computed accordingly,
rise to -20, -80, -26 (see Table 20 for the indexes on a v-ix basis).
When the noncontractual exchanges are removed from total de-
fault settlements to obtain settlements of interest and principal
defaults, the pattern takes on a more nearly positive shape. Settle-
ments of interest and principal defaults typically expand over
cycle stages vu-rn, with a pronounced rise during the first half
of expansions. When account is taken of the tendency of this
series to lead turning points in the reference cycle, the con-
formity indexes rise markedly to +45, +40, +70.
Influence of New D4aults and Default
Settlements on Net Changes in
Outstandings in Default
The procedures employed in Chapters 2 and 3 to analyze the
influence of offerings and extinguishments on the net change
in total outstandings may be applied here to determine the con-
tributions of new defaults and settlements to the net change in
outstandings in default. The analysis will be conducted in terms
of total new defaults and settlements; but because of the rela-204 DEFAULTS
tively small volume of noncontractual exchanges settled on date
of default, the conclusions would not be modified greatly if
derived solely from interest and principal defaults.
It has been demonstrated that when a series is obtained as
the difference between two series—one with high and one with
CHART 26—Average Annual Rank Patterns for








low variability—the series with the higher variability dominates
the resultant series unequivocally, provided the component series
are uncorrelated. The influence of each component on the re-
sultant is reduced somewhat if the component series are positively
correlated and is amplified if the series are negatively correlated.
On the other hand, the effect of intercorrelation may be neglected
























other.13 These principles may be applied to the default estimates,
the net change in outstandings in default being the resultant
series and new defaults and default settlements its components.
The railroad estimates are the prototype of a set of series in
which one component (new defaults), by virtue of its high
variability, dominates the resultant (the net change in outstand-
ings in default). As Table 21 indicates, the variance of new
rail defaults is over four and one-third times that of rail settle-
ments, and the correlation between the two series is low and not
significantly different from zero (+0.25). In consequence, the
TABLE 21—Correlation Coefficients and Variance Ratios for
New Defaults, Default Settlements, and Net Changes in








New defaults and default
settlements +0.25 +O.39a
New defaults and net
changes in default
outstandings +0.85a+0.88b +O.59a +0.71a
Default settlements and
net changes in defauLt
outstandings +0.03 —0.23 —0.28
Ratios of variancesb
New defaults to default
settlements 3•57c 437c 1.42 1.71
Based on annual data, Table A-17.
aAcoefficient of this size or larger would be obtained by chance in
less than S out of 100 trials if drawn from a population in which the
variables are uncorrelated.
bFora discussion of the variance and variance ratio see Chapter 2,
footnote 14 and the concluding statistical note.
cAvariance ratio of this size or larger would be obtained by chance in
less than 5 out of 100 trials if drawn from a population in which the
variables have equal variances.
correlation between new defaults and the net change is high
while that between default settlements and the net change is
low. Since the component series are virtually uncorrelated in
the sample, the sample variance of the net change is approxi-
18Seethe statistical demonstration ending Chapter 2.206 DEFAULTS
mately equal to the sum of the variances of new defaults and
settlements. Thus, about 80 percent of the variance
in the net change in outstandings in default is attributable to new
defaults and the remainder to default settlements.
Since rail defaults account for such a large proportion of
total defaults, the relationship between new defaults and net
changes is essentially the same for the combined industries as
it is for the rails. Despite the fact that new defaults and de-
fault settlements show significant positive correlation in this case
(+0.55),thevery high variance ratio between new defaults
and settlements (3.57) makes the correlation between new de-
faults and net changes highly significant (+0.85) while that
between settlements and net changes is negligible. Again we have
a situation in which new defaults, by virtue of their greater
variability, dominate the year-to-year movements in outstand-
ings.14
Because defaults were settled more quickly for public utility
and industrial bonds than for rails, the variance ratios for utilities
and industrials are much lower and the correlation coefficients
between new defaults and settlements are significantly different
from zero. It follows that in those industries new defaults had
comparatively less influence on the net changes, as the lower
correlation coefficients show. On the other hand, there is a slightly
higher negative correlation between settlements and the net
changes, and for industrials the coefficient is significant.
Because of the close association between new defaults and the
net changes for rails, the turning points of the specific cycles
in the two series usually occur in the same year. The same is
true for the combined industries, but no such systematic rela-
tionship is observable for utilities and industrials. On the other
hand, since the par amount of outstandings in default is ob-
tained by cumulating the net changes, it continues to rise so long
as the net changes are positive and falls only when the net
changes turn negative. In contrast with the net changes in total
outstandings (cf. page 61), the default net changes alternate
between positive and negative values, and outstandings in de-
14Itwill be recalled from Chapter 3 that an analogous situation holds for
the net-change series in total outstandings, where the annual variations may
be ascribed mainly to the component new-money offerings rather than to
repayments.DEFAULTS 207
fault exhibit specific cycles with turning points lagging those in
default net changes (and for rails and the combined industries,
lagging turning points in new defaults )Ashas been indicated,
settlements also usually lag new defaults at turning points.
DEFAULT AND SETrLEMENT RATES
The risk of default on corporate bond investments may be
measured through default rates obtained by relating the absolute
amount of new defaults to the aggregate volume of securities
"eligible" for default (i.e. the volume of bonds in good stand-
ing). Settlement rates, obtained by relating the absolute amount
of settlements to the aggregate volume of securities eligible for
settlement (i.e. the volume of bonds in default), provide informa-
tion on the speed of settlement.
Default Rates
So far as short-run movements in default rates are concerned,
very little needs to be added to what has already been said about
new defaults. Since the volume in good standing (the base on
which the rate is computed) forms a smooth series relative to
new defaults, default rates almost always move over the short
run in the same direction as new defaults; in fact, their annual
peaks and troughs can be located accurately from the graph of
new defaults (Chart 25). Moreover, the several indexes of cyclical
conformity of default rates are identical with those given in Table
20 for new defaults, with the single exception of the full-cycle
index for industrials. The latter changes, however, only from -79
for new defaults to. -68 for default rates, the smallest change
possible in a full-cycle index for a series covering ten reference
cycles.16 Thus default rates, like new defaults, exhibit high nega-
tive conformity with business cycles.
Estimates of long-period levels of default rates were obtained
by averaging the annual rates over selected periods and are
15Compare,for example, peaks in new defaults for the combined indus-
tries (Table A-17) in 1914, 1919, and 1933 with corresponding peaks in
defaulted outstandings in 1916, 1921, and 1986; and troughs in new defaults
in 1916, 1921, 1926, 1928, and 1937 with corresponding troughs in defaulted
outstandings in 1918, 1924, 1927, 1929, and 1938.
Aconformity index of —79 for a series covering ten reference cycles
indicates 17 inverse movements out of 19 comparisons; an index of —68
indicates 16 inverse movements out of 19.208 DEFAULTS
presented in Table The table indicates that despite the large
absolute volume of rail defaults during the period 1900-1943,
the average annual default rate for rails was just slightly above
that for utilities (the difference is not significant) but was sig-










Average default rate (percent)





0.9 1.5 2.1 1.1













0.4 1.1 2.9 0.9
1.8 2.4 1.8 1.7
0.6 1.1 1.6 0.8
4.1 1.9 4.4 2.9













1.6 2.7 7.4 1.2
10.8 1.8 13.8 3.7
1.9
12.5
Based on annual data, Tables A-17, A-18, and A-21.
aOwingto the extreme non-normality of the distribution of default
rates, the variances presented here should not be used in standard tests
of the difference between means. They are useful, however, as measures
of dispersion.
nificantly below that for industrials. Large issues, a substantial
proportion of which were rail issues, also had significantly lower
average default rates than small issues.'8
17Estimatesof long-period default rates may, of course, be computed in
other ways than by averaging the annual rates, for example by striking a
ratio of the average amount of new defaults over the period to the average
of outstandings in good standing, or to the average of total outstandings.
Rates were computed on these bases as a check on the results of Table 22.
They generally agreed closely in level with the rates presented here and
always agreed in rank.
18Thestandard large-sample test for the difference between means makes
use of the fact that the means of large samples are normally distributed.
Since the annual default rates have a highly skewed distribution, and since
the sample contains only 44 items, the applicability of the large-sample test
might be questionable. The default rates were therefore "normalized" by
means of a cube-root transformation before the above-mentioned differences
were tested for significance.DEFAULTS 209
In addition to the size of the default rate, another important
consideration to investors is its stability; other things being equal,
it is to build up an adequate reserve for default losses
when default risk is steady than when it is not.19 It is interesting
to note in this connection that the most stable default rates over
the period 1900-1943 prevailed on utility and large issues, and
the greatest instability on industrials; small issues and rails
occupied intermediate positions.
Default rates up to 1930 are of particular interest as reflecting
the factual bases for conservative investment opinion before the
Great Depression. During the period 1900-1929 default rates were
lower on the average for the rails than for the other industry
groups and were more stable. Rail bonds, accordingly, were
favored as outlets for the funds of personal trusts and invest-
ment intermediaries. The sharp rise in rail default rates in the
thirties was shocking at the time, but was later to prove less
serious than the long period of time required to effect rail re-
organizations and to settle rail defaults, which will appear when
settlement rates are considered. Actually, as the data of Table
22 indicate, rail bonds had lower default rates than industrials
in the thirties, and in fact in all decades covered by our records
except that spanning World War I, when the two groups had
the same average rate. Moreover, rail default rates had a slightly
lower variance in the thirties than industrial rates. But the heavy
defaults on industrial bonds were more quickly settled and per-
haps for that reason attracted less public attention.
The earlier conclusion as to the superior default record of
large as against small issues, which was based on the ratio of
defaulted outstandings to total outstandings, is supported by the
average default rates of Table 22. Default rates on the large
issues were lower than those on small issues in all periods ex-
cept the decade 1900-1909, when both groups had the same
average rate. The variance of default rates was also lower for
large than for small issues, especially in the period 1930-43. Thus,
default rates of large issues fluctuated less about a lower average
rate.
Thequestion of the actual reserves requfred to offset default losses on
various groups of securities will be treated in a later monograph.210 DEFAULTS
Settlement Rates and the Interval
between De-fault and Settlement
Default rates measure the relative flow per unit interval of time
of bonds in good standing into the "stock" of defaulted bonds,
and settlement rates, the relative flow out of this stock. While
settlement rates are thus analogous to default rates, an addi-
tional problem arises in their construction owing to the fact
that substantial amounts of new defaults are usually settled
within the year of default. It follows that the group of bonds
"eligible" for settlement within a given year is not simpiy the
amount in default at the beginning of the year but that amount
plus the amount going to default during the year. Ratios of the
total volumes of default settlements to the corresponding amounts
eligible for settlement were computed on an annual basis, and
their averages over selected periods are presented in Table 28.
Table 24 presents similar average settlement rates for defaults of
TABLE 23—Average Annual Settlement Rates on Total Cor-
porate Bond Defaults, and Implied Length of Time






Average settlement rate (percent)
1900-1943 27.1 21.7 27.7 33.0 26.2 28.5
1900-1929 33.2 28.0 30.9 35.8 32.9 31.4
1930-1943 14.1 8.4 20.9 27.0 11.9 22.4
1930-1939 15.4 8.8 20.7 27.2 12.8 23.2
Contraction and
trough years24.8 17.3 19.3 31.9 23.5 21.2
Expansion and
peak years 28.1 23.6 31.2 33.5 27.3 31.6
1900-1943
implied period from default to settlement
3.7 4.6 3.6 3.0 3.8
(years)
3.5
1900-1929 3.0 3.6 3.2 2.8 3.0 3.2
1930-1943 7.1 11.9 4.8 3.7 8.4 4.5




4.0 5.8 5.2 3.1 4.3 4.7
peak years 3.6 4.2 3.2 2.0 3.7 3.2
Based on annual data, Tables A-17 and A-18. The settlement rate
used here is defined in footnote 20.DEFAULTS 211
interest and principal.20 The latter table is the more meaningful of
the two, since the problem of the speed of settlement of de-
faulted bonds is encountered only with interest and principal
defaults, others being settled on date of default.
TABLE 24—Average Annual Settlement Rates on Corporate
Bond Defaults of Interest and of Principal, and Implied




Average settlement rate (percent)
1900-1943 19.4 15.2 22.7 24.2 20.0 19.9
1900-1929 23.5 19.3 26.0 25.1 25.2 20.7
1930-1943 10.7 6.4 15.7 22.3 8.8 18.2





15.5 10.0 14.3 24.4 16.4 13.5
21.1 17.4 26.2 24.2 21.5 22.6
1900-1943
Implied period from default to settlement (years)
5.2 6.6 4.4 4.1 5.0 5.0
1900-1929 4.3 5.2 3.8 4.0 4.0 4.8
1930-1943 9.3 15.6 6.4 4.5 11.4 5.5





6.5 10.0 7.0 4.1 6.1 7.4
4.7 5.7 3.8 4.1 4.7 4.4
Based on annual data, Tables A-17 through A-20. The settlement rate
used here is defined in footnote 20.
It will be recalled that turnover rates on total outstandings
were used in Chapter 2 to approximate the length of life of
corporate bonds. When averaged over fairly long periods, settle-
ment rates may be used similarly to obtain rough approxima-
tions to the interval from default to settlement, although in the
short run annual settlement rates are highly unstable and of little
significance, owing to extreme fluctuations in the annual volume
20LetE equal noncontractual exchanges and contract modifications settled
on date of default; N, total new defaults; S. default settlements; and D, out-
standings in default, beginning of calendar year. Then the settlement rate
for total defaults (Table 23) is defined as SI ( D + N), and the rate for
interest and principal defaults (Table 24) as (S —E) / ( D + N —E).212 DEFAULTS
of defaults and settlements. On the average, the lower the settle-
ment rate, the longer the time that ensues between dates of de-
fault and settlement; hence the reciprocals of the average settle-
ment rates computed over fairly long periods may be used to
rank the various industry and size groups by length of time re-
quired to settle default situations; A better method, of course,
would be to determine the mean interval from default to settle-
ment from information on individual issues; but the mean can-
not be computed until all defaults within a given period have
been settled. Nevertheless a few long-period medians have been
computed for the large issues, and in general they substantiate
the conclusions drawn from the reciprocals of the average settle-
ment rates,21
For the entire period covered by our study, settlement rates
for interest and principal defaults averaged 19.4 percent, which
suggests an "average" interval from default to settlement of
slightly over five years. (The median interval, 1900-1939, was
three years, six months.) In 1929 or thereabouts an era of gen-
erally high settlement rates came to a close and a period of
extreme slowness of settlement began. For the combined in-
dustries the implied interval from default to settlement was
about four years during 1900-1929 (median, two years, nine
months); in the decade after 1929 it rose to about nine years
(median, 1930-39, four years, five months).
Over and above specific problems confronting individual
obligors, which might be expected to offset one another in the
average for a group, are general legal and economic considera-
tions that bear on the duration of defaults, influencing behavior
as between groups. In the legal or quasi-legal category are such
factors as the current status of the laws relating to receivership
and bankruptcy, the degree of regulation and supervision im-
posed on the industry group, and the variety and complexity
of the legal claims running against the obligors (the complexity
2].Variousformulas based on settlements were tested in addition to those
used in constructing Tablesand 24. While the results differed considerably
as to level, nevertheless industry, size, and trend comparisons based on them
generally remained invariant with respect to rank. It will be recalled that in
Chapter 2 turnover rates and medians similarly differed and yet agreed: the
implied number of years varied as between the two types of measurements,
but rank and trend implications were mutually substantiating.DEFAULTS 213
of their capital structures). Under the economic heading, the
most important set of forces influencing ease of settlement is
the level and direction of earnings, for when earnings are low
and falling it is quite difficult to arrange a plan of settlement
that will be both fair to the senior creditors and acceptable to
junior and equity interests.22
The influence of such legal and economic factors on the speed
of settlement is clearly revealed in the settlement rates for the
various industry and size groups in Table 24. For example, the
railroads generally have complex capital structures as compared
with other industry groups, and in some respects are more closely
supervised during reorganization. Moreover, their earnings were
extremely low throughout the thirties. Thus for the full period
studied and for each of the subperiods shown in the table, their
average settlement rates were low as compared with those of
the other industry groups, particularly so for the periods begin-
fling in 1930. The corresponding rates were always higher for
industrials, where earnings responded more quickly to improved
business conditions after 1932, where capital structures have
generally been simpler, and where there has been somewhat less
regulatory supervision over reorganization proceedings. As their
settlement rates imply, obligors in the utility field have usually
occupied a position intermediate between rails and industrials
with respect to speed of settlement. While normally subject to
close regulation, the capital structures of the operating companies
are typically less complex than those of the railroads, and their
earnings were maintained in the thirties. The ranks of the median
intervals from default to settlement in general support those
conclusions: for the period 1900-1939, they were eight years,
six months for rails; two years, nine months for utilities; and two
years, three months for industrials.
Small issues had roughly the same settlement rates as large
issues before 1930 and maintained a high rate thereafter, whereas
the rate for large issues fell very low. The majority of the small
22Asthe United States Supreme Court observed in a leading case: "Find-
ings as to the earning capacity of an enterprise are essential to a determina-
tion of the feasibility as well as the fairness of a plan of reorganization."
(Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. 312U.S.510,525 [19411,
quotedby DeForest Billyou in "A Decade of Corporate Reorganization
under Chapter X," Columbia Law Review, Vol. 49, p. 498.)214 DEFAULTS
defaulted issues in this period were obligations of industrial and
public utility corporations, groups which, as we have seen, had
less difficulty in effecting reorganization than the rails. More-
over, the obligors of small issues were on the average smaller
in asset size than those of large issues and presumably had less
complex capital structures.
Table 24 also presents average settlement rates for contrac-
tion and trough years in general business activity and for ex-
pansion and peak years. The settlement rates were lower in con-
traction than in expansion years for all groups except industrials,
for which the two rates were practically identical. This finding
is supported by the fact that settlement rates on interest and
principal defaults, like the par amounts of such settlements, show
low positive conformity with business cycles. The full-cycle con-
formity indexes for the settlement rates, calculated on a i-v basis,
are: +16 for the combined industries, for rails, —16 for
utilities, +26 for industrials, +26 for large issues, +26 for small
issues.
Table 23, which pertains to settlements of total defaults, in-
dicates that over most periods the interval between default and
settlement was from one to two years lower on total defaults
than on interest and principal defaults alone. Since issues with
a zero interval between default and settlement are included in
the total defaults, the difference in the intervals shown by Tables
23 and 24 is in the direction to be expected. Otherwise, the
rates for total defaults tell essentially the same story as those
based on interest and principal defaults. The settlement rates
were uniformly higher in the early period than after 1929, and
were always higher in expansion and peak years than in con-
traction and trough years. Moreover, the rates were lowest for
rails and highest for industrials. Like interest and principal de-
faults, total defaults in the thirties were more quickly settled on
small issues than on large.